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Implementing an International Lender of Last Resort 
Abstract 
Current research discusses various general frameworks for installing an international 
lender of last resort (ILOLR). However, it remains unclear how the ILOLR should actu-
ally operate. This paper discusses six different options of construction of an ILOLR who 
supports central banks in the case of currency crises. The paper concludes that the cost 
efficient version of the ILOLR would be direct interventions by the IMF by the use of 
IMF resources and the right to dispose additional reserves from central banks. The paper 
considers measures of cost efficiency, such as cost of borrowing, intervention, and ster-
ilization and moral hazard problems. 
JEL classification: F02, F33 




Die aktuelle Diskussion zur Reform des Instrumentariums des IWF beinhaltet Vorschlä-
ge zur Implementierung eines International-Lender-of-Last-Resort (ILOLR). Die Debat-
te lässt jedoch offen, wie die konkrete Implementierung erfolgen soll. Dieser Beitrag 
diskutiert sechs verschiedene ILOLR-Optionen, die Notenbanken im Falle von Wäh-
rungskrisen  unterstützen.  Es  wird  geschlussfolgert,  dass  direkte  Interventionen  des 
ILOLR zur Unterstützung der betroffenen Währung zu bevorzugen sind. Dazu verwen-
det der IWF eigene Ressourcen und Rechte auf weitere Ziehungen im Bedarfsfall. Als 
Kriterien werden Momente der Kosteneffizienz wie z.B. Kosten der Zahlerländer, Ko-
sten der Kreditaufnahme, der Intervention und der Sterilisation sowie Moral-Hazard-
Probleme berücksichtigt. 
Schlagworte:  International-Lender-of-Last-Resort,  Internationaler  Währungsfonds, 
Währungskrisen  
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1  Introduction 
The ongoing discussion of how the international financial institutions should support 
countries in order to minimize the risk of currency crises is now bearing a new child: the 
Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL). However, as it was the case with its precursor, the 
Contingent Credit Line (CCL), any instrument that is not build upon the requirements of 
credibility of the potential action to be taken in the case of a crisis is limited in its use 
and can as in the case of Brazil and its 1998 crisis even be counteractive. One instru-
ment, which is discussed in economic theory since more then a century ago, and works 
well in practice, is the lender of last resort function of central banks.1 Its international 
counterpart the international lender of last resort (ILOLR) has also been widely dis-
cussed.2 Still, it is not implemented today and while the transmission mechanisms of an 
international lender of last resort operation have been outlined in the literature there is a 
gap in spelling out how the ILOLR should be implemented. 
From the previous debates it evolved that the basic task of the ILOLR would be the pro-
vision of foreign exchange liquidity to central banks in cases of emerging currency cri-
ses to enable central banks to stabilize their exchange rates. Just as in the case of the na-
tional lender of last resort, the liquidity should be provided immediately and quantita-
tively unlimited. These requirements as well as that the qualifying condition of the pro-
vision of under normal conditions good collateral needs to be translated into the interna-
tional  frame  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  instrument  requires  a  pre-qualification 
process. This is in line with the currently discussed instruments of the IMF. 
In this paper it is argued that the provision of liquidity by the ILOLR towards central 
banks is not necessary if the fundamental goal of avoiding a currency crises could be 
solved by other measures, e.g. direct interventions by the ILOLR. In this case the term 
“lender” in international lender of last resort must be interpreted in a broader sense, also 
as an “intervener” of last resort. The paper takes this approach to derive an implementa-
tion mode of an ILOLR that is cost efficient with regard to the underlying target, the 
stabilization of the exchange rate. A fundamental assumption of the paper is that inter-
ventions in foreign exchange markets can be successfully undertaken in order to stabi-
lize  exchange  rates.  It  is  also  assumed  that  avoiding  currency  crises  is  beneficial. 
Whereby, this paper considers only costs and benefits resulting directly form the ILOLR 
operation, indirect effects through more stable international finical markets are not con-
sidered here. 
                                                 
1   See Bagehot (1874), Thornton (1802: 173-174). 
2   Compare e.g. Rogoff (1999), Fisher (1999).  
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Sections 1 and 2 specify the requirements of the ILOLR and obligations of weak cur-
rency countries.3 Section 3 discusses various cost and revenues accruing from ILOLR 
operation. Section 4 consolidates costs and revenues to derive a cost efficient version of 
the ILOLR whilst Section 5 discusses the implementation of the ILOLR. The Conclu-
sions will summarize the findings of this paper in the last section of this paper. 
                                                 
3   “Weak currency countries” are countries with currency under depreciative pressure. All other countries 
are called “strong currency countries”.  
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2  Specification of the ILOLR 
To prevent currency crises the ILOLR has to fulfill two conditions. Firstly, it is essential 
that the ILOLR is able to overcome the limits of unilateral exchange rate policy in the 
case of currency crises; it is in particular essential to supply necessary additional cur-
rency reserves to defend the target exchange rate as discussed in section 2.1. The exis-
tence of an ILOLR can lead to moral hazard problems caused by asymmetric informa-
tion about the actual situation and planed policies in weak currency countries. There-
fore, secondly, the construction of the ILOLR should be able to help to avoid the poten-
tial abuse of the instrument. This is achieved through the formulation of qualification 
pre-requisites for potential weak currency countries, discussed in section 2.2. 
2.1  Designs of the ILOLR 
The limits of unilateral exchange rate policies’ ability to act are reached, if the interven-
tion potential of a central bank is exhausted. This is the case if currency reserves, which 
are used to prevent a market-induced depreciation or to target an appreciation of the ex-
change rate in line with the objective of optimal exchange rate policy, are depleted.4 The 
definite limitation of currency reserves of every central bank leads to a permanent vul-
nerability of economies regarding the optimality of exchange rates and with that it leads 
to a risk for currency crises and macroeconomic instability. This process is linked with 
economic and social costs.5 The vulnerability to currency crises should be prevented by 
the ILOLR. 
Therefore, the ILOLR provides additional reserves for central banks, which got into a 
situation of a significant shortage of currency reserves, to maintain an exchange rate tar-
get as long as the shortage was not caused by policy decisions that were not target com-
patible. This provision needs to be executed in a way that secures the ability to achieve 
the operational exchange rate objective at any time. This requirement results in the need 
for additional reserves to be available at short notice and in the need for it to be quanti-
tatively organized in a way which allows targeting the exchange rate even in the case of 
massive speculation against the exchange rate target. 
Speculation against a currency can hold on as long as assets, which can be liquidated in 
the short term, held by residents and non-residents can be transferred into foreign cur-
rency. To counter such an extreme speculation effectively, the ILOLR would need to in-
tervene with an amount equal to a so-defined monetary aggregate. Since currency crises 
                                                 
4  Compare Burger, Knedlik (2004). 
5  Baldacci et al. (2002) illustrate empirically that currency crises are not only linked with e.g. high infla-
tion or rising unemployment, but also lead to rising poverty and higher inequality of income distribu-
tion.  
IWH  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 20/2006  8
have been observed to develop in different countries at the same time, it is not enough to 
consider just one country; the intervention potential of the ILOLR should suffice also 
for support of countermeasures for several parallel crises. In the case of a global crisis 
up to the limits of the ‘speculation potential’, almost unlimited reserves would be neces-
sary. Mundell (1983: 208) gives a number and talks about a world central bank with as-
sets of 100 billion US-Dollars. However, as such massive speculation is judged to be 
highly unlikely, the holding of such enormous reserves seems to be unnecessary. In fact, 
as discussed below, the ILOLR affects speculation through its existence and not neces-
sarily through action. Thus, the ILOLR should be constructed in a way in which a quan-
titative limit for support is not explicitly formulated, but rather is referred to as unlim-
ited. Knowing support in unlimited amounts to be virtually impossible and hardly nec-
essary, the term  ‘virtually unlimited support’ is useable. 
The availability of ILOLR support at short notice can only mean a support in an intra-
day time frame, taking the enormous daily volumes of the currency markets and the 
massive capital outflows in cases of speculative attacks into account.6 From the re-
quirements of constant disposition of additional reserves follows that the repayment of 
granted loans needs to be organized in a flexible manner as not to lead directly to new 
pressures on the control of the exchange rate. Moreover, the costs for debtors should not 
be too high. Very high costs could force central banks to give up the optimal exchange 
rate target because the result of the trade-off between costs of keeping the target and the 
costs of giving up the target could turn. 
In the remainder of the paper, six different effective scopes for arrangements for the use 
of ILOLR will be introduced. In section 3 the possibilities of the ILOLR will be dis-
cussed considering the question of arising costs to be able to execute an efficiency ex-
amination. An overview over different scopes for composition can be found in table 1. 
According to this the ILOLR function can be fulfilled, if the ILOLR issues loans itself or 
mediates loans (cases 1, 2, 3). Alternatively the ILOLR intervenes at the currency mar-
kets or demands interventions by third country’s central banks (cases 4, 5, 6). Following 
this discussion, the acquisition of used means is differentiated. Thus, the ILOLR can 
dispose of own deposits (cases 1, 4); however, it could only have the right of disposition 
of these deposits by third central banks in case of demand (cases 2, 3, 5, 6). If the char-
acteristics are combined, eight combinations arise overall. However, due to practical 
considerations two cases are excluded which are marked by the ILOLR having access of 
deposits, but not using those. 
 
 
                                                 
6   Mishkin (2000, pp. 13-14) states that a fast reaction of the ILOLR leads to lesser necessary interven-
tion volumes.   
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Table 1: 
Scopes for arrangements of the ILOLR 
  ILOLR has access to deposits  ILOLR has options for draw-
ings from third central banks 
ILOLR issues loans itself   Case 1  Case 2 
ILOLR intermediates credit from 
third central banks  
This case is excluded.  Case 3 
ILOLR intervenes on its own  Case 4  Case 5 
ILOLR intermediates interven-
tions by third central banks  
This case is excluded.  Case 6 
Source: Own presentation. 
Before the different cases are discussed in detail another important feature of the ILOLR 
implementation is introduced: the formulation of prerequisites for weak currency coun-
tries. 
2.1  Specification of weak currency country obligations 
To prevent various possible unintended uses of the provided reserves, requirements for 
potential weak currency countries of ILOLR support need to be formulated. It is to be 
ensured that the ILOLR support is only used for its purpose and only in the case of an 
actual demand, and that the resulting debt will be settled at a later date. These potential 
problems are typical examples for principal agent relations,7 wherein the agent (here: 
weak currency country) uses the lack of information of the principal (here: ILOLR) 
about the agent’s actual situation (e.g. solvency, compatibility of aims of the existing 
politics) as well as about the agent’s intentions (e.g. default, misuse) to maximize his 
profits or utility by rational behavior individually. 
The discussion of the requirements of the ILOLR has highlighted that the support of the 
ILOLR needs to be carried out immediately. This has an effect on the requirements for 
potential recipients of support of the ILOLR in terms of the qualification process for the 
support, the requirements needing to be completed before the occurrence of specific 
problems.8 Since currency crisis or preliminary problems are rarely anticipated9 and be-
cause the market structure of foreign currency markets does not allow precise predic-
                                                 
7   As primarily source for principal agent theory compare Jensen, Meckling (1979). 
8   Compare Bird, Joyce (2004: 139), Fischer (2002: 24-26) for the so-called pre-qualification. 
9   As show by the example of the Asian crisis 1997/98. See Feldstein (1998); Gilbert, Irwin, Vines 
(2000, p. 18); Kregel (1998, p. 13); Sachs (1998, p. 17); Fischer (2001b).  
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tions of currency crises,10 the fulfillment of the requirements needs to be granted per-
manently also. 
Potential moral hazard problems between weak currency countries and the ILOLR are: 
first, hiding information about the actual situation; second, hiding information about the 
actual intentions to repay; third, hiding information about the actual intentions to (mis-
)use the support. 
To limit information asymmetry, the ILOLR has to follow economic and political devel-
opments in a country constantly. To receive support by the ILOLR, countries must have 
the duty to supply information about economic as well as exchange rate policy related 
developments. This duty has to include the use of standardized statistic procedures as 
well as the supervision of the data acquisition by the ILOLR. The generation of mean-
ingful data should constitute the base for the supervision of exchange rate policy. What 
is considered as optimal policy needs to be defined explicitly and comprehensible for 
both sides. A country is qualified for support by the ILOLR, if data about macroeco-
nomic developments and the use of monetary policy instruments are permanently laid 
open and if these are consistent with what is considered as optimal or qualifying poli-
cies. 
The problem of hidden intentions could be limited by creating incentives that favor the 
repayment of loans. Such arrangements could include negative incentives, such as the 
disqualification for ILOLR support, or positive incentives, such as interest rate discounts 
for fast repayments. The establishment of qualification criteria can allow for predictions 
about the likelihood of a default. These could contain, for example, indicators for the 
independence of central banks or corruption indices.11 Another solution, mentioned in 
the sub-section above, would be the direct intervention of the ILOLR on currency mar-
kets or to put a third central bank in charge to intervene instead of providing loans to the 
affected central bank. The risk of a loan default does not exist in this case. In the case of 
a loan, corresponding price signals could give an incentive for an object consistent use 
of the support. If interest rates for loans of the ILOLR are above the market interest rates 
for foreign currency dominated bonds, it is little rewarding for national authorities to use 
ILOLR loans for other objectives. To support exchange rate policy, these loans would 
still be interesting due to their immediate and unlimited availability. 
Indicators are able to flag the potential misuse of loans or interventions. Indicators could 
be, for example, the missing need for objective consistent support or the observation of 
sufficient national currency reserves. As important as leading to a disqualification from 
                                                 
10  Schmidt, Bofinger (2003) show that exchange rate developments are purely predicted even in non-
crises situations. 
11  For the role of corruption in monetary policy in developing countries compare Huang, Wei (2003, pp. 
23-24), Köhler (2002).  
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ILOLR support would be the observations of a permanent reduction of currency reserves 
to limit or give up own security precautions. It would be important to develop a mini-
mum reserve requirement which is defined as a certain part of the sum of short-term 
lending and liquidable portfolio investment. The size of this part should be calculated 
individually for each country depending on the history of capital flow volatility or on the 
size of trade volumes of the currency on currency markets. The IMF recommends as a 
starting point the complete coverage of foreign short-term debt by currency reserves. 
The complete coverage could be extended or lowered depending on the exchange rate 
regime, the currency nomination of foreign debt, the current account balance, the devel-
opment of the real exchange rate, the access of the private sector to international capital 
markets and the level of the short-term domestic debt (as indicator for the tendency to 
capital flight by residents). Thereby, the common agreement on and the supervision of 
minimum currency reserve requirements are of high importance.12 
Other criteria should aim at the compliance with international standards in the financial 
sector. These standards, for example for foreign indebtedness of banks and for the ac-
counting of foreign currency positions in large companies, could contribute to the reduc-
tion of the vulnerability of national economies by currency crises and thus, lead to lower 
risk regarding the probability of speculative attacks. Such general criteria should also 
include consistent monetary, fiscal, regulatory and general economic policies.13 
Another, contraire aspect of the moral hazard issue is that it might only be interesting 
for countries to keep an eye on the optimality of their policies, if they are not constantly 
jeopardized by external developments. This means that the establishment of the ILOLR 
does not have to lead to decreasing efforts in terms of reducing the vulnerability for cur-
rency crises, but also might have the opposite effect.14 Thus, if the achievement of an as 
optimal  considered  flexible  exchange  rate  target  is  unlikely  as  a  result  of  external 
shocks, it might be reasonable - in the sense of a second best strategy - to switch to sim-
pler but suboptimal exchange rate regimes such as flexible exchange rates or dollariza-
tion. The installment of the ILOLR would lead to a practice of optimal exchange rate 
policy as the help of the ILOLR makes it possible to guaranty the exchange rate. 
                                                 
12  See IMF (2000, pp. 20-21), Fischer (2001a) and “Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Reserve Manage-
ment“ (IMF, 2001a). 
13  Compare e.g. “Guidelines for Public Debt Management“ (IMF, 2001b). 
14  Corsetti et al. (2003, p. 37).  
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3  Costs and revenues of operating an ILOLR 
Costs and revenues arise simultaneous on three functional levels: the lending, the inter-
vention in currency markets and the sterilization of the intervention on money markets. 
The functional levels can be attributed to three different actors: weak currency countries, 
the ILOLR and strong currency countries. The section is subdivided among the line of 
the actors wherein the different functional levels are discussed. It is assumed that in any 
case the support of the ILOLR will lead to interventions in foreign exchange markets in 
support of the weak currency currency, thereby the intervention could be undertaken by 
the weak currency country, the ILOLR or by strong currency countries’ central banks. It 
is further assumed that interventions by the weak currency country’s central bank are 
sterilized in order to not interfere with monetary objectives.15 The reserves necessary 
for the intervention could either be provided by the ILOLR or strong currency countries 
to the weak currency countries by loans, or the ILOLR or the strong currency countries 
could intervene directly without granting loans to the weak currency country. 
3.1  Costs and revenues for weak currency countries 
Regarding the costs and revenues of the ILOLR operation for weak currency countries 
the six cases introduced in section 2.1 can be summarized into two groups: cases includ-
ing a lending operation (cases 1, 2, 3) and cases excluding lending operation (cases 4, 5, 
6). This follows from the fact that the different cases financing the ILOLR operation do 
not make any difference for the costs and benefits for weak currency countries. 
Costs and revenues of the lending operation (cases 1, 2, 3 in table 1): Firstly, by raising 
a loan, costs amounting to the interest of the loan (iCR CR) are generated. To be able to 
distinguish between the different types of costs, it is assumed that central banks place 
the funds short-term with a profit objective. Considering these profits, losses of raising 
loans amount from the difference between the loan interest rate (iCR) and the interest rate 
paid for short-term assets held in foreign currency (iS Strong) multiplied by the volume of 
the loan (CR). Additionally, the central bank could opt to default. Thus profits from de-
fault (P Default) have to be considered. 
Costs and revenues of the intervention  (cases 1, 2, 3): If a part of the loan is used for an 
intervention in currency markets (IN), there will be no revenues from holding assets in 
foreign currency (iS Strong  IN). As a result of intervention16 the domestic money base will 
decrease, which generates costs amounting to the domestic refinancing interest rate mul-
tiplied by the intervention volume (iRF  Weak  IN). Thus, intervention costs can be de-
                                                 
15  This includes the assumption that sterilizing operations are effective. 
16  Purchase of domestic currency against foreign currency.  
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scribed as the sum of short-term interests in the strong currency country and the domes-
tic  refinancing  interest  rate  multiplied  by  the  intervention  volume.  Additionally  the 
weak currency country has to cover the risk of changes in the value of the domestic cur-
rency (value risk) if interventions do not succeed. 
Costs and revenues of the sterilization (cases 1, 2, 3): Because interventions decrease 
the domestic money base, sterilizations are intended to compensate for that shrinking by 
broadening domestic refinancing. Hence, revenues amounting to the domestic refinanc-
ing interest rate multiplied by the sterilization volume will evolve (iRF Weak  ST). 
Consolidated costs and revenues in the loan cases (cases 1, 2, 3): Total costs of loan, 
intervention and sterilization operations for the weak currency country can be summa-
rized as follows: 
Costs Weak = (iCR · CR – iS Strong  · CR) + (iS Strong · IN + iRF Weak   IN) - (iRF Weak   ST) 
– P Default + value risk.  (1) 
If costs are consolidated under the assumption of the whole volume of the loan being 
used for interventions (or paid back immediately) and that the intervention is sterilized 
completely (KR = IN = ST), effective costs amount to the loan interest rate multiplied 
by the loan volume minus profits from default and plus the costs resulting from the risk 
of devaluation: 
Costs Weak = (iCR · CR – iS Strong  · CR) + (iS Strong  · CR + iRF Weak  ·CR) 
- (iRF Weak  · CR) – P Default + value risk 
= CR (iCR – iS Strong  + iS Strong  + iRF Weak  - iRF Weak ) – P Default 
+ value risk 
= CR · iCR – P Default + value risk.  (2) 
Costs and revenues in the direct intervention cases (cases 4, 5, 6): Another effective so-
lution would be direct interventions by the ILOLR. The ILOLR intervenes directly in 
support of the currency under depreciation pressure without actually issuing a loan. The 
domestic central bank does not pay any interest. These interventions leave the domestic 
money base and the refinancing of the banking system untouched as the central bank 
does not take any action in the money and currency markets. Thereby neither revenues 
nor costs for the weak currency country arise based on the intervention; this case is neu-
tral in costs for the weak currency country (compare table 2).  
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Table 2: 
Losses of the weak currency countries 
  Loans to weak currency central 
banks (cases 1,2,3) 
Intervention by the ILOLR or 
strong currency countries (cases 
4,5,6) 
Losses  CR · iCR – P Default + value risk  cost-neutral 
Source: Own presentation. 
Section 4 discusses which possibility is preferred under considering the moral hazard 
problems and costs for strong currency countries. Before this endeavor can be under-
taken the costs and benefits for the ILOLR itself and the strong currency countries have 
to be specified. 
3.2  Costs and revenues for the ILOLR 
To fulfill the task of contributing to optimal exchange rate policy in weak currency 
countries by direct inventions or loans, the ILOLR needs currency reserves to provide 
them in cases of limitations of the domestic intervention potential of a country. The 
ILOLR has to draw the currency reserves from other central banks since the ILOLR 
cannot issue own money. There are two possibilities for generating these reserves. The 
ILOLR could, in analogy to the IMF, draw loans and intervention potential from depos-
its of member countries, holding it for those times when countries are in necessity of 
support.17 Alternatively, the ILOLR could be limited to a mediating function which in-
cludes entitlements to the provision of reserves by potential strong currency countries.18 
The postulation of virtually unlimited intervention potential of the ILOLR requires a vir-
tually unlimited volume of currency reserves of the ILOLR. 
Costs and revenues of holding deposits (cases 1, 4): If the ILOLR draws from deposits 
of member countries, costs arise which amount to the difference of the deposit interest 
rate (iDE) and the interest rate paid on short-term assets of strong currencies (iS Strong) 
multiplied by the volume of the deposits of the member states (SDE). If costs of paying 
deposit  interest  are  lower  than  interest  revenues  from  assets  in  strong  currency,  the 
ILOLR will achieve profits from the holding of deposits and vice versa. 
Costs and revenues of options for drawings from strong currency countries (cases 2, 5): 
If the ILOLR has only a mediating function, making the holding of reserves unneces-
                                                 
17  It is here assumed that all member states of the IMF would take part in the ILOLR.  
18  The ILOLR will be used when the currency of a country is under a massive depreciative pressure. This 
country is termed as weak currency country. Since exchange rates are defined as bilateral, every coun-
try with a currency under depreciative pressure has a counterpart in a country with a currency under 
appreciative pressure, here called the strong currency country.   
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sary, there will be no costs involved for the ILOLR, except those possible costs resulting 
from holding the option for reserve provisions by third central banks (K Option). 
Costs and revenues of interventions by the ILOLR (cases 4, 5): Not only the holding of 
deposits incurs revenues or losses for the ILOLR, but also interventions and issuing 
loans. In case of direct interventions in support of a currency under pressure the ILOLR 
will be confronted with costs amounting to short-term interest rates in strong currency 
countries (iS Strong) multiplied by the intervention volume (IN)19 and revenues amounting 
to interest rates paid for short-term assets in weak currency countries (iS Weak) multiplied 
by the intervention volume.20 If the ILOLR is to intervene in foreign exchange markets 
the risk of the change of the value of the purchased currency (value risk) occurs. 
Costs and revenues of issuing loans (cases 1, 2): In the cases of issuing a loan to a weak 
currency country, arising revenues amount to loan interest rates (iCR) multiplied by loan 
volume (CR) and costs amounting to short-term interest rates on strong currency coun-
tries assets (iS Strong) multiplied by the loan volume (CR). The profit equals the difference 
of the loan and the asset interest multiplied with the loan volume. In the loan case, loan 
default costs (K Default) need to be considered amounting to the loan sum multiplied by 
the default risk. 
Costs and revenues of interventions or loans by strong currency countries (cases 3, 6): 
Up until now we did not consider the case in which the ILOLR limits itself to a mediat-
ing function. A situation in which the ILOLR does not get active in the case of the need 
to supply loans or intervene in currency markets but leaves the intervention and loan is-
sue to the strong currency central banks based on defined rights, which allow the ILOLR 
to demand these actions. There are no costs for the ILOLR involved that go beyond the 
possible expenditures for the right to demand interventions or loan issues by strong cur-
rency countries (K Right). 
Costs and revenues for ILOLR operation for all possible instrument arrangements: In 
table 3 costs and revenues for the six different arrangements are merged. In all cases the 
ILOLR has to carry costs of monitoring the qualification requests and administrative 
costs (monitoring costs). With regard to the objective of overcoming the limitations of 
national politics, all possibilities are effective. A comment on which type of the ILOLR 




                                                 
19 This volume is not available to be hold as interest bearing asset.  
20 Successful intervention and with that stability of an exchange rate are assumed.   
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Table 3: 
Losses of the ILOLR 
  ILOLR has access to deposits   ILOLR has options for drawings 
from third central banks  
ILOLR issues loans itself  
(iDE – iS Strong) · SDE  
+ (iS Strong – iCR) · CR + K Default 
+ monitoring costs 
K Option + (iS Strong – iCR) · CR 
+ K Default+ monitoring costs 
ILOLR mediates loans by third 
central banks  
This case is excluded.   K Right+ monitoring costs 
ILOLR intervenes on its own  
(iDE – iS Strong) · SDE  
+ (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN 
+ monitoring costs  
+ value risk 
K Option  
+ (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN 
+ monitoring costs  
+ value risk 
ILOLR mediates intervention 
by third central banks 
This case is excluded.   K Right + monitoring costs 
Source: Own presentation. 
3.3  Costs and revenues for strong currency countries 
Costs and revenues for countries, which enable the ILOLR to fulfill its function by their 
deposits, loans or direct intervention, are a most important factor within the analysis of 
an efficient arrangement of an ILOLR. A one-sided burden would be a serious obstacle 
for the installment of the ILOLR. This section will investigate the costs of an ILOLR for 
strong currency countries, and contrast the costs with the benefits. 
Costs and revenues in the deposit case (cases 1,4): In the simplest case for strong cur-
rency countries, they provide permanent deposits to the ILOLR who can use these assets 
in case of demand (cases 1, 4). The action of the ILOLR itself causes losses or profits, 
which have to be somehow transferred to strong currency countries sometimes. For now 
these losses and profits will remain unexamined, while assuming that losses as well as 
profits of the ILOLR will be balanced over periods by carrying them forward. If this is 
the case, costs and profits for strong currency countries (which include potential weak 
currency countries as well)21 result from the provision of the domestic currency only. 
Costs arise from the loss of interest on money base due to sterilization (iRF Strong · DE) 
and profits arise from the return of deposits held with the ILOLR (iDE · DE). From this 
                                                 
21  In the current construction of the IMF, deposits are hold by all member countries, so that strong cur-
rency countries include crises vulnerable countries too.   
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the implication can be drawn that central banks shorten domestic money supply by exact 
the same amount which they transfer to the ILOLR and, thereby, sterilize the transac-
tion. The loss of the whole transaction amounts to the difference between the domestic 
refinancing interest rate and the deposit interest rate multiplied by the amount provided 
(compare table 4). The deposit transaction is neutral in costs for the central bank if in-
terest rates are equal. The calculation of deposit interest rates at the IMF Special Draw-
ing Rights is carried out by using a weighted average of the three-month money market 
rates of the Euro, Yen, British Pound and US-Dollar.22 Depending on the monetary pol-
icy framework, three-month money market rates can develop similar to shorter-term 
rates, which justifies the assumption.23 For the costs of the strong currency countries in 
the deposit case it is irrelevant whether the ILOLR uses deposits to issue loans or to in-
tervene. 
Costs and revenues in the case of options for drawings by the ILOLR (cases 2, 5): If 
there are no deposits to be held with the ILOLR, but there are just options for provision 
of domestic currency for the case of an actual intervention or granting of loans (cases 2, 5), 
then costs for strong currency countries will arise from missing interest on domestic 
money base. Costs amount to (iRF Strong · CR) respectively (iRF Strong · IN), depending on 
whether an intervention is conducted or a loan granted. There are revenues of interest 
payments by the ILOLR amounting to (iDE · CR) respectively (iDE · IN). If it is assumed 
that possible profits or costs of activities of the ILOLR are forward written, the ILOLR 
bears the default risk, then costs for strong currency countries equal the difference of the 
domestic refinancing rate and the ILOLR interest rate on deposits multiplied by the loan 
or intervention volume. If deposits are repaid to the strong currency country after the 
loan matured or after the repurchase of intervention reserves, different profits accrue 
compared to the case of permanent deposits. Costs or revenues will be lower depending 
on different maturities of deposits. In the event of an equality of refinancing and deposit 
interest rates, neither losses nor profits will accrue. 
Costs and revenues in the direct intervention and loan cases (cases 3, 6): Another pic-
ture evolves if supply countries do not only hold risk free deposits at the ILOLR, but if 
they are also obliged to act as loan supplier or intervener. In the loan case (case 3), reve-
nues equal loan interest rates multiplied by the loan volume (iCR · CR) and costs equal the 
lost return from issuing domestic money base (iRF Strong  · CR) plus default costs (K Default). 
In the event of direct interventions of strong currency countries in currency markets in 
support of a weak currency (case 6), revenues from holding the foreign currency assets 
purchased by intervention (iS Weak  IN) and costs of loss of interest paid on money base 
(iRF Strong  IN) arise. Costs and profits can also result from changes in currency valuation 
                                                 
22  IMF (2005a). 
23  Compare Bofinger (2001, pp. 332-333).  
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(value risk). If an intervention is successful and the exchange rate develops in line with 
interest parity, then sterilized interventions are cost neutral. 
Table 4 considers also revenues of strong currency countries from requirements of the 
ILOLR  of  provision  of  reserves  (P  Option)  and the obligation of intervention or loan 
granting (P Right).24 The losses presented in table 4 can be transformed into cost neutral-
ity if a few simplifying assumptions are introduced. These assumptions are: The strong 
currency country’s refinancing rate matches the deposit interest rate of the ILOLR and 
the credit interest rate paid by the weak currency country to the supply country; a loan 
outfall is excluded; and the intervention is successful (ensuring interest rate parity). De-
pending on which assumption is given up or added, different loss-profit constellations 
will result. The most probable assumption to come true is the success of intervention 
and ensuring of interest rate parity. This assumption is sufficient to conclude that inter-
ventions by a third central bank on behalf of the ILOLR in favor of a weak currency are 
always neutral in costs (apart from administrative costs). 
Table 4: 
Losses of strong currency countries (without valuation changes) 
  ILOLR has access to de-
posits 
ILOLR has options for drawings 
from third central banks 
ILOLR issues loans itself  (iRF Strong  – iDE) · DE  (iRF Strong  – iDE) · CR – P Option 
ILOLR mediates loans by third cen-
tral banks   This case is excluded. 
(iRF Strong  – iCR) · CR 
+ K Default – P Right 
ILOLR intervenes on its own  (iRF Strong  – iDE) · DE  (iRF Strong  – iDE) · IN – P Option 
ILOLR mediates interventions by 
third central banks   This case is excluded. 
(iRF Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN – P Right 
+ value risk 
Source: Own presentation. 
That costs of support of the ILOLR by strong currency countries are negligible can be 
seen above. Hence, the discussion of benefits for strong currency countries from the sta-
bility in weak currency countries is dispensable. But it should not be forgotten that in-
vestors from strong currency countries might be individually hit by sudden depreciations 
of their investments, that loan suppliers have to cope with loan defaults, or that export-
ers could be confronted with a decreasing foreign demand.25 Even if such problems of 
sudden depreciation in an emerging market country will only lead to marginal costs in 
                                                 
24  Administrative costs arising with the operation are not included. It is also assumed that such expendi-
tures arise within daily business permanently and that costs of such activities are negligible.  
25  Compare Bird (2003, p. 194), Madrick (1998, p. 42), Wohlmuth (2003, p. 1).  
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potential strong currency countries, then it is still the case that significant negative ef-
fects will be perceived in strong currency countries as well. This is especially the case in 
the event of an accumulation of crises, as can be found in the case of contagion, such as 
in the course of currency crises in South East Asia 1997-98 and Russia 1999.26 Costs 
which have to be carried by strong currency countries due to social misery in the form of 
political instability and migration are left out of the consideration here.27 
To draw a possible conclusion: An ILOLR can be arranged in such a way that it is neu-
tral in costs except administrative costs for strong currency countries too. 
                                                 
26  Fischer (1998, p. 1) calls the mentioned crises „the global economic crisis“. 
27  Compare Rogoff (1999, p. 11).  
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4  Consolidating costs and revenues 
In this section, costs and profits of the ILOLR arising for several players will be aggre-
gated in a social welfare function. This will enable us to control for which effective in-
strument should be preferred when implementing the ILOLR. 
Table 5: 
Losses from activities of the ILOLR 
Variations of the ILOLR  Losses for strong 
currency countries  Losses for the ILOLR  Losses for weak 
currency countries 
ILOLR has deposits and 
issues loans (case 1) 
(iRF Strong – iDE) · 
DE 
(iDE – iS Strong) · SDE  
+ (iS Strong – iCR) · CR + K Default 
+ monitoring costs 
CR ·iCR 
- P Default 
+ value risk 
ILOLR has deposits and 
intervenes on its own 
(case 4)  
(iRF Strong – iDE) · 
DE 
(iDE – iS Strong) · SDE  
+ (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
cost neutral 
ILOLR has options for 
drawings and issues 
loans (case 2) 
(iRF Strong – iDE) · CR 
- P Option 
K Option  + (iS Strong – iCK) · CR 
+ K Default + monitoring costs 
CR · iCR - P Default 
+ value risk 
ILOLR has options for 
drawings and intervenes 
on its own (case 5)  
(iRF Strong – iDE) · IN 
- P Option 
K Option   
+ (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
cost neutral 
ILOLR has right to de-
mand loan supply by a 
strong currency country 
(case 3)  
(iRF Strong – iCR) · CR 
+ K Default   
- P Right 
K Right 
+ monitoring costs 
CR · iCR  
- P Default 
+ value risk 
ILOLR has right to de-
mand intervention by a 
strong currency country 
(case 6) 
(iRF Strong - 
 iS Weak) · IN  
- P Right 
+ value risk 
K Right 
+ monitoring costs  cost neutral 
Source: Own presentation. 
The analysis of different varieties of costs of the ILOLR for participating countries dis-
cussed above leads to some economic conclusions relating to an optimal conception of 
the ILOLR. It appears that a direct intervention by the ILOLR or by a strong currency 
country should be favored over the issue of a loan. This leads to lower costs for weak 
currency countries and is furthermore connected with lower risks for supply countries as 
the probability of a default by moral hazard can be excluded. Different varieties of costs 
of the ILOLR are summarized in table 5. It is considered which level takes the risk of 
value changes and which costs could arise for monitoring qualification criteria of weak  
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currency countries as well as possible revenues for weak currency countries in the case 
of a default.28 
Assuming strong currency countries to adjust profits or losses of the ILOLR, the costs of 
strong currency countries and costs of the ILOLR could be consolidated.29 It should be 
emphasized that important information is lost with such a consolidation. In the case of a 
strong currency country intervening or issuing loans itself, costs due to value losses or 
loan default might arise only in this country. But if the ILOLR is bearing the risk and re-
sulting costs or profits, then all countries which hold deposits will bear the risk.30 This 
important difference should be no hindrance for consolidation at this moment; it will be 
considered later on. In going one step further by consolidating all costs arising with 
ILOLR activities including those from weak currency countries, a picture evolves as in 
table 6. This step is derived from the consideration of which losses accrue in the frame 
of a global welfare function.31 
Table 6: 
Consolidated losses from activities of the ILOLR 
Variations of the ILOLR  Consolidated Losses for strong currency and weak  
currency countries and the ILOLR 
ILOLR has deposits and issues loans (case 1)  (iRF Strong – iS Strong) · SDE + (iS Strong) · CR 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
ILOLR has deposits and intervenes on its own 
(case 4)  
(iRF Strong – iS Strong) · SDE + (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
ILOLR has options for drawings and issues loans 
(case 2) 
(iRF Strong – iDE + iS Strong) · CR 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
ILOLR has options for drawings and intervenes 
on its own (case 5)  
(iRF Strong – iDE + iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
ILOLR has right to demand loan supply by a 
strong currency country (case 3)  
(iRF Strong) · CR 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
ILOLR has right to demand intervention by a 
strong currency country (case 6) 
(iRF Strong – iS Weak) · IN 
+ monitoring costs + value risk 
Source: Own presentation. 
                                                 
28  A more detailed reflection of the quantification of value risks will be given in the course of this sec-
tion.  
29  In doing so, the simplifying assumption of an adjustment of profits and losses of the ILOLR over time 
will be given up and be replaced by supposing that the strong currency country will cover profits and 
losses of the ILOLR. 
30  The countries holding deposits match the member states of the IMF.  
31  The concept of welfare used here assumes that costs represent welfare losses and profits welfare prof-
its. For the aggregation of welfare results into a global welfare function, it is assumed that welfare of 
each country is weighted equally.   
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A global welfare analysis of costs of the ILOLR includes a comparison of costs caused 
by the ILOLR with the costs arising from international financial architecture without the 
ILOLR. Within the scope of tasks of the IMF, funds are spent already to observe the de-
velopment of member states (including the setting of standards in statistic data).32 Since 
these costs arise anyhow, attributing these to the instrument of the ILOLR can only be 
partially justified. Assuming that hitherto existing expenses for monitoring of the IMF 
by implementing the ILOLR will not increase significantly, they can be disregarded in 
further analyses as marginal considerations.33 
To simplify the analysis, it will be presumed that interest rates for short-term assets 
equal refinancing interest rates in the respective countries. This is justifiable with re-
quirements which hold that interest-bearing assets need to be able to be liquidized per-
manently. Hence, short-term relates to time periods at the over-night money market. 
Normally, rates at over-night money markets diverge barely from refinancing interest 
rates, so the equalization is justified.34 Another assumption is the analogousness of in-
terest rates on deposits of the ILOLR with the interest rates of refinancing rates in strong 
currency countries. Such an interest rate method is found in the current construction of 
the IMF.35 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the amount of direct interventions by strong currency 
countries or the ILOLR is identical to the loan amount which is used for interventions 
by weak currency countries. In doing so, it is ignored that interventions of different in-
stitutions  might  entail  different  reactions  of  market  players  which  would  demand  a 
higher or lower volume of intervention respectively.36 These effects can be dampened 
by communicative means.37 Table 7 reflects these assumptions in a simplified form. 
                                                 
32  E.g. in terms of the 2001 created „International Capital Market Department“ (IMF 2002, p. 2, Köhler 
2001). 
33  The actual needs of extension of the monitoring function will be illustrated in the section below.  
34  For the perfect controllability of rates of over-night money by central banks, compare Bofinger (2001, 
pp. 328-332). 
35  Compare section  3.3. 
36  It is imaginable that intervention by the ILOLR or strong currency countries could be executed more 
credible than intervention by weak currency countries and could be executed at lower volumes.  
37  It could be balanced by a guarantee of strong currency countries or the ILOLR to grant loans unlim-
ited.   
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Table 7: 
Losses from activities of the ILOLR with simplifying assumptions   
Variations of the ILOLR  Consolidated Losses 
ILOLR has deposits and issues loans (case 1)  (iS Strong) · IN + value risk 
ILOLR has deposits and intervenes on its own (case 4)   (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN + value risk 
ILOLR has options for drawings and issues loans (case 2)  (iS Strong) · IN + value risk 
ILOLR has options for drawings and intervenes on its own 
(case 5)   (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN + value risk 
ILOLR has right to demand loan supply by a strong cur-
rency country (case 3)   (iS Strong) · IN + value risk 
ILOLR has right to demand intervention by a strong cur-
rency country (case 6)  (iS Strong – iS Weak) · IN + value risk 
Source: Own presentation. 
A further assumption is introduced to encourage clarity of costs of the ILOLR. If it is as-
sumed that operations of the ILOLR are successful, then there is no value risk. Ex-
change rates vary under the assumption of optimality in accordance with the theory of 
interest parity.38 Value changes can be described as follows: 
1 1 1 ( 1) ( )
+ + + -
= - = - - = - = - ×D
t t t t
t t t
S S S S
value loss IN IN IN IN IN s
S S S
.  (3) 
When including interest parity: 
( ) S Strong S Weak s i i D = -   (4) 
resulting in a value loss of: 
value loss =  ( ) S Strong S Weak IN i i - × - .  (5) 
By implementing this value loss in table 7, figures as presented in table 8 result. 
Under these assumptions, direct intervention solutions by the ILOLR or by strong cur-
rency countries are neutral in costs concerning a global welfare function. These should 
be preferred to a loan issue causing welfare losses. 
                                                 
38  Compare Burger, Knedlik (2004).  
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Table 8: 
Losses from activities of the ILOLR when keeping interest parity 
Variations of the ILOLR  Consolidated Losses 
ILOLR has deposits and issues loans (case 1)  (iS Strong ) · IN - (iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN 
= iS Weak  ·IN 
ILOLR has deposits and intervenes on its own 
(case 4)  
(iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN - (iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN 
= zero 
ILOLR has options for drawings and issues 
loans  (case 2) 
(iS Strong ) · IN - (iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN 
= iS Weak  · IN 
ILOLR has options for drawings and intervenes 
on its own (case 5)  
(iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN - (iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN 
= zero 
ILOLR has right to demand loan supply by a 
strong currency country (case 3)  
(iS Strong ) · IN - (iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN 
= iS Weak  · IN 
ILOLR has right to demand intervention by a 
strong currency country  (case 6) 
(iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN - (iS Strong  – iS Weak ) · IN 
= zero 
Source: Own presentation. 
For an explanation of different kinds of welfare losses, the simple example of a direct 
loan issue or intervention by strong currency countries should be consulted. Thereby, no 
costs or profits arise for the ILOLR. The revenues of a strong currency country in the 
loan case will amount to the difference between loan interest rates and strong currency 
country’s interest rates multiplied with the loan volume, which result from the loan issue 
and the necessary sterilization of the expansion of domestic money supply respectively. 
In the event of a direct intervention by a strong currency country, profits are generated 
from placing the acquired foreign currency reserves amount to the weak currency coun-
tries interest rate multiplied by the intervention volume. Simultaneously costs accrue 
due to the sterilization amounting to strong currency country’s interest rate multiplied by 
the  intervention  volume. The  difference  between both  options  for  a  strong  currency 
country lies in the difference of revenues, though being confronted with identical costs 
(sterilization costs) in both cases. Hence, in case of higher loan interest rate than weak 
currency country’s interest rate, the loan issue option is favorable for strong currency 
countries and in the alternative case (higher weak currency country’s interest rate than 
loan interest rate) an intervention would be preferred to a loan issue. 
In weak currency countries, both alternatives will also lead to different costs and reve-
nues. As demonstrated in section 4.1, in the case of interventions by strong currency 
countries neither costs nor revenues accrue because the domestic money base – consist-
ing of refinancing money supply and currency reserves – is left untouched. In other 
words: since the weak currency country is not intervening itself, there is no necessity of 
sterilizing this intervention. But in the case of a loan issued to a weak currency country 
where it has to intervene itself the situation is different. Besides loan costs (loan interest  
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rate multiplied with the loan sum) and profits (strong currency country’s interest rate 
multiplied with the loan volume), there will also be intervention and sterilization reve-
nues or costs respectively. The intervention bears costs because possible interest earn-
ings from placing the loan volume will omit (supply country’s interest rate multiplied 
with the intervention volume). Additionally, interventions will lead to a contraction of 
the money supply and with this to extra costs in the amount of the weak currency coun-
try’s interest rate multiplied with the intervention volume. These extra costs will be 
completely balanced when sterilizing the intervention totally (revenues due to the ex-
pansion of money supply in the amount of the intervention volume multiplied by the 
weak currency country’s interest rate). To sum up: Loan revenues are compensated by 
intervention costs. Sterilization revenues will balance the second part of intervention 
costs. The difference between the alternatives of loan and intervention is formed by loan 
costs. 
If combining the levels of strong currency and weak currency countries, it appears that 
the  difference  between  the  alternatives  of  loan  and  intervention  for  strong  currency 
countries lie in the difference between loan and weak currency country’s interest rates 
multiplied with the intervention volume; while for weak currency countries there are 
only loan costs. When consolidating costs and profits of participants, loan costs and 
revenues are omitted. The difference between weak currency country’s interest rates 
multiplied by the intervention volume remains, originating from the interest bearing of 
acquired foreign currency during the intervention by the strong currency country. 
The analysis has so far demonstrated that direct intervention solutions should be pre-
ferred over a loan issue, a conclusion that applies to the analysis of global welfare as 
well as for considerations of moral hazard problems. Therefore, loan issue solutions will 
be disregarded in the following. Intervention solutions can be classified into three cate-
gories: Firstly, the ILOLR has deposits and intervenes itself; Secondly, the ILOLR has 
demands on deposits and intervenes itself; Thirdly, the ILOLR has demands on inter-
vention by strong currency countries. But which alternative is preferable? 
Since in all cases neither costs nor profits arise for weak currency countries, these can be 
excluded from the analysis. An important difference between direct intervention by a 
strong currency country (case 6) and an intervention by the ILOLR (cases 4 and 5) lies – 
as mentioned above – in the attribution of costs and revenues from the intervention. 
While in case 6, possible costs and revenues arise for one country only, all countries 
which hold deposits, and with that balance the result of the ILOLR, will have to bear the 
costs and profits of an intervention in cases 4 and 5.  Costs and revenues from the opera-
tion will only accrue, if the intervention is not successful. Hence, it is not appropriate to 
talk of costs and profits, but of risks. To not incur the danger of straining a single coun-
try with all risks, the first two cases should be preferred in constructing the ILOLR.  
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5  Implementation of the ILOLR by IMF reform 
One assumption of the remarks about the requirements on the ILOLR, as illustrated in sec-
tion 2, was that the intervention volume should be unlimited, at least virtually. As deposits 
of whichever amount cannot ensure unlimited quantity, case 4 (intervention by the ILOLR 
out of deposits) cannot meet this requirement. However, in the framework of the reforms 
of the IMF for the implementation of an ILOLR, it is hardly reasonable not to access de-
posits of member states since they are held nevertheless.39 The first case can easily be in-
tegrated into the existing system, but it is not sufficient. Therefore, there have to be addi-
tional options for further deposits from member states.40 The „General Arrangements to 
Borrow” allow the IMF to access another US$ 26 Bn which are provided by eleven indus-
try nations on demand. The „New Arrangements to Borrow“, adopted in 1998, raise these 
provisions up to US$ 52 Bn that are mobilized by 26 countries.41 In the sense of theoreti-
cal boundlessness of intervention potential, these additional refund possibilities should be 
quantitatively unlimited. Moreover, there should exist closely defined rights of the ILOLR 
to  spare  long term decision processes.42 Thus, a sufficiently considered option of the 
ILOLR would be a combination of intervention by the ILOLR drawing from deposits with 
the option on expansion of deposits in case of demand. Hence, recapitulating, the ILOLR 
should be implemented by reforms of the IMF:43 
1.  Intervention mechanism: The IMF creates a permanently available intervention 
mechanism whose activation is based on the observation of political and eco-
nomic developments (especially currency reserves). This mechanism will sup-
port member states in the case of realization of optimal policy in combination 
with a shortage of national currency reserves by interventions in currency mar-
kets. Volume and duration of interventions are depending on the requirements 
for maintenance of optimal national policies and are theoretically unlimited. 
The intervention mechanism can be carried out automatically as far as possible. If 
                                                 
39  The IMF disposes of an intervention potential of US$ 117 Billion and deposits in the amount of US$ 
327 Bn on Feb. 28
th, 2005 (IMF, 2005b).  
40  Another possibility would be to massively augment deposits of member states. Since one fourth of de-
posits must be held in form of foreign currency, this idea is disapproved (IMF, 2005b). Especially for 
countries with limited access to international capital markets, a raise of quotas would be connected 
with an increase in costs, since these countries would have to pay higher risk premiums for the acquisi-
tion of reserves, but would receive the same deposit interest rates (Compare Polak, 2004, p. 250). 
41  Among these countries are also emerging market countries such as Chile, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand. Compare IMF (2005c). 
42  At the moment, strong currency countries have to accept an extension of deposits on demand of the di-
rector of the IMF whereupon the executive board activates the refunding mechanism.  
43  As mentioned in above, this paper concentrates on the reform of the IMF. Another discussed alternative 
institution to implement the ILOLR would be the Bank for International Settlements which appears to be 
little qualified due to limited capacities to monitor the qualification requirements (Mishkin, 2000, p. 19).  
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the compliance with optimal policy rules is being observed in a member state and 
currency reserves run short of the agreed minimum currency reserve rate, then it is 
noticed and communicated between member states and the IMF.44 If an increase 
of currency reserves is not possible without violation of the optimality of policy, 
the monitoring is intensified. This allows the ability to intervene in favor of the 
weak currency in the case of an under-running of the agreed level of currency re-
serves. The ILOLR intervention mechanism should be incorporated into the main 
fund facilities. This would meet its central importance in terms of crises preven-
tion. A change of the Articles of Agreement would not be necessary. 
2.  Monitoring and consulting functions: The IMF could adapt its monitoring func-
tion to the requirements of the ILOLR for potential weak currency countries. This 
function must especially ensure the permanent control of qualification criteria. To 
prevent stigmatization of applicant countries, qualification criteria needs to be 
controlled constantly and results should be publicly communicated. Thereby, an 
early-warning mechanism should allow adjustments of suboptimal policies, so 
that a sudden disqualification will not become a crisis trigger itself.45 The provi-
sion of standardized macroeconomic data is already been secured.46 The formula-
tion, discussion and conjoint processing of optimal national money and currency 
politics should be integrated as a new instrument of consulting tasks of the IMF. 
The surveillance of the realization of these policies is as important as the perma-
nent observation of the development of currency reserves. Furthermore, interna-
tional standards of transparency, independence and capital market stability should 
be seized. There are already activities in the IMF today.47 The establishment of 
such a monitoring and consulting function can be carried out within the frame-
work of the existing Articles of Agreement, especially in terms of article IV. 
3.  Additional  reserves: Member states commit to the provision of additional re-
serves on demand with the objective to guarantee the unlimited nature of the in-
tervention potential. For implementation, the General Arrangements to Borrow 
described above should be changed adequately. Thereby, fixation certain maxi-
mum amounts should be given up in favor of calculated percentages analogue to 
the IMF quotas.48 
                                                 
44  The use of the currency reserves as an intervention criteria leads to the dispense of complicated early-
warning systems of currency crises (for an overview see: Abiad, 2003a, 2003b, pp. 3-6). 
45  In this regard it should be evaluated whether there are intermediate solutions between qualification and 
disqualification. Thus, ILOLR support could be quantitatively limited. Moreover, member states that 
cannot qualify still have access to other instruments of the IMF. 
46  Compare „Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board“ which provides the „Special Data Dissemination 
Standard“ and the „General Data Dissemination System“ (IMF, 2005d). 
47    Compare IMF (2004). 
48  Compare IMF (2005c).  
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6  Conclusions 
The discussion of the costs and revenues of the operation of an ILOLR shows that the 
version of direct interventions by the IMF is to be preferred. The necessary funds should 
be drawn from member state deposits and from additional reserves provided by member 
states on demand. The whole operation of the ILOLR could be run without incurring 
costs except administrative costs. Finally, if the ILOLR instrument is credibly installed, 
there is no need for actual operation. In analogy to the national lender of last resort, the 
ILOLR takes effect by its pure existence.  
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